“(II) more than 35 percent of such gross receipts consist of premiums.

Clause (ii) shall not apply to a company if any employee of the company, or a member of the employee’s family (as defined in section 2032A(e)(2)), is an employee of another company exempt from taxation by reason of this paragraph (or would be so exempt but for this sentence).

(b) CONTROLLED GROUP RULE.—Section 501(c)(15)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting “except that in applying section 831(b)(2)(B)(ii) for purposes of this subparagraph, subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 1563(b)(2) shall be disregarded” before the period at the end.

(c) DEFINITION OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR SECTION 831.—

Section 831 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d) and by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:

“(c) INSURANCE COMPANY DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘insurance company’ has the meaning given to such term by section 816(a)).”.

(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Clause (i) of section 831(b)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking “exceed $350,000 but”.

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2003.

(2) TRANSITION RULE FOR COMPANIES IN RECEIVERSHIP OR LIQUIDATION.—In the case of a company or association which—

(A) for the taxable year which includes April 1, 2004, meets the requirements of section 501(c)(15)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect for the last taxable year beginning before January 1, 2004, and

(B) on April 1, 2004, is in a receivership, liquidation, or similar proceeding under the supervision of a State court,

the amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after the earlier of the date such proceeding ends or December 31, 2007.

SEC. 207. CONFIRMATION OF ANTITRUST STATUS OF GRADUATE MEDICAL RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAMS.

(a) FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.—

(1) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(A) For over 50 years, most United States medical school seniors and the large majority of graduate medical education programs (popularly known as “residency programs”) have chosen to use a matching program to match medical students with residency programs to which they have applied. These matching programs have been an integral part of an educational system that has produced the finest physicians and medical researchers in the world.

(B) Before such matching programs were instituted, medical students often felt pressure, at an unreasonably early stage of their medical education, to seek admission to, and accept offers from, residency programs. As a result, medical students often made binding commitments before they were in a position to make an informed decision.
about a medical specialty or a residency program and before residency programs could make an informed assessment of students’ qualifications. This situation was inefficient, chaotic, and unfair and it often led to placements that did not serve the interests of either medical students or residency programs.

(C) The original matching program, now operated by the independent non-profit National Resident Matching Program and popularly known as “the Match”, was developed and implemented more than 50 years ago in response to widespread student complaints about the prior process. This Program includes on its board of directors individuals nominated by medical student organizations as well as by major medical education and hospital associations.

(D) The Match uses a computerized mathematical algorithm, as students had recommended, to analyze the preferences of students and residency programs and match students with their highest preferences from among the available positions in residency programs that listed them. Students thus obtain a residency position in the most highly ranked program on their list that has ranked them sufficiently high among its preferences. Each year, about 85 percent of participating United States medical students secure a place in one of their top 3 residency program choices.

(E) Antitrust lawsuits challenging the matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process. The costs of defending such litigation would divert the scarce resources of our country’s teaching hospitals and medical schools from their crucial missions of patient care, physician training, and medical research. In addition, such costs may lead to abandonment of the matching process, which has effectively served the interests of medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a century.

(2) PURPOSES.—It is the purpose of this section to—

(A) confirm that the antitrust laws do not prohibit sponsoring, conducting, or participating in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or agreeing to do so; and

(B) ensure that those who sponsor, conduct or participate in such matching programs are not subjected to the burden and expense of defending against litigation that challenges such matching programs under the antitrust laws.

(b) APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAMS.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:

(A) ANTITRUST LAWS.—The term “antitrust laws”—

(i) has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)), except that such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition; and
(ii) includes any State law similar to the laws referred to in clause (i).

(B) GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAM.—The term “graduate medical education program” means—
   (i) a residency program for the medical education and training of individuals following graduation from medical school;
   (ii) a program, known as a specialty or subspecialty fellowship program, that provides more advanced training; and
   (iii) an institution or organization that operates, sponsors or participates in such a program.

(C) GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION RESIDENCY MATCHING PROGRAM.—The term “graduate medical education residency matching program” means a program (such as those conducted by the National Resident Matching Program) that, in connection with the admission of students to graduate medical education programs, uses an algorithm and matching rules to match students in accordance with the preferences of students and the preferences of graduate medical education programs.

(D) STUDENT.—The term “student” means any individual who seeks to be admitted to a graduate medical education program.

(2) CONFIRMATION OF ANTITRUST STATUS.—It shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, or participate in a graduate medical education residency matching program, or to agree to sponsor, conduct, or participate in such a program. Evidence of any of the conduct described in the preceding sentence shall not be admissible in Federal court to support any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitrust laws.

(3) APPLICABILITY.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt from the antitrust laws any agreement on the part of 2 or more graduate medical education programs to fix the amount of the stipend or other benefits received by students participating in such programs.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act, shall apply to conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after such date of enactment, and shall apply
to all judicial and administrative actions or other proceedings pending on such date of enactment.