Economics 2061, Dynamic Games and Contracts
Professor Susan Athey
Course Home Page
Time and Place: Friday, 1 p.m. - 4 p.m., Littauer M-15
The Class Will Not Meet: 9/28
Class Format: The class will be a mix of lectures and student presentations
Class Requirements: The main class requirement will be a term paper. The paper will be a critical literature review of a particular topic, together with a proposal for a research project in that area. The secondary requirement will be a student presentation in class.
Reading List: Look here for the reading list. Only a subset of papers will be covered.
|Date||Topic||Reading (see reading list for more sources)|
|9/21||Static mechanism design||Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, Chp. 23|
|10/5||Static mechanism design, Common value auctions||
Milgrom, P. and R. Weber, "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica,1982, 50, 1089-1122.
|10/12-10/19||Repeated Games: Tools and Methods||
Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti, "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,"Econometrica v58, n5 (September 1990): 1041-63.
Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and E. Maskin, "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,"Econometrica v62, n5 (September 1994): 997-1039.
|10/26||Games with Transfers; Dynamic Games|
|11/2||Relational Contracts and Trading Games||
Levin, J., “Relational Incentive Contracts”
Athey, S. and D. Miller, “Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations,” Theoretical Economics, 2 (2007), 299-354.
Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, "Optimal Collusion with Private Information." RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn 2001.
Athey, S., K. Bagwell, and C. Sanchirico, "Collusion and Price Rigidity." REStud, 2004.
Athey, S. and K. Bagwell, ""Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks" forthcoming, Econometrica.
9/21: Static mechanism design. Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, Chapter 23.